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Subject: 89-478--OPINION, MARYLAND v. CRAIG




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-478



MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. SANDRA ANN CRAIG

on writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of maryland

[June 27, 1990]



    Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
    This case requires us to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a child witness in a child abuse
case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant's
physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television.

I
    In October 1986, a Howard County grand jury charged respondent, Sandra
Ann Craig, with child abuse, first and second degree sexual offenses,
perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery.  The named victim in each
count was Brooke Etze, a six-year-old child who, from August 1984 to June
1986, had attended a kindergarten and prekindergarten center owned and
operated by Craig.
    In March 1987, before the case went to trial, the State sought to
invoke a Maryland statutory procedure that permits a judge to receive, by
one-way closed circuit television, the testimony of a child witness who is
alleged to be a victim of child abuse. {1}  To invoke the procedure, the
trial judge must first "determin[e] that testimony by the child victim in
the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate."  Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. MDRV 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).  Once the procedure is invoked, the
child witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel withdraw to a separate room;
the judge, jury, and defendant remain in the courtroom.  The child witness
is then examined and cross-examined in the separate room, while a video
monitor records and displays the witness' testimony to those in the
courtroom.  During this time the witness cannot see the defendant.  The
defendant remains in electronic communication with defense counsel, and
objections may be made and ruled on as if the witness were testifying in
the courtroom.
    In support of its motion invoking the one-way closed circuit television
procedure, the State presented expert testimony that Brooke, as well as a
number of other children who were alleged to have been sexually abused by
Craig, would suffer "serious emotional distress such that [they could not]
reasonably communicate," MDRV 9-102(a)(1)(ii), if required to testify in
the courtroom.  App. 7-59.  The Maryland Court of Appeals characterized the
evidence as follows:

"The expert testimony in each case suggested that each child would have
some or considerable difficulty in testifying in Craig's presence.  For
example, as to one child, the expert said that what `would cause him the
most anxiety would be to testify in front of Mrs. Craig. . . .'  The child
`wouldn't be able to communicate effectively.'  As to another, an expert
said she `would probably stop talking and she would withdraw and curl up.'
With respect to two others, the testimony was that one would `become highly
agitated, that he may refuse to talk or if he did talk, that he would
choose his subject regard- less of the questions' while the other would
`become extremely timid and unwilling to talk.' "  316 Md. 551, 568-569,
560 A. 2d 1120, 1128-1129 (1989).


Craig objected to the use of the procedure on Confrontation Clause grounds,
but the trial court rejected that contention, concluding that although the
statute "take[s] away the right of the defendant to be face to face with
his or her accuser," the defendant retains the "essence of the right of
confrontation," including the right to observe, cross-examine, and have the
jury view the demeanor of the witness.  App. 65-66.  The trial court
further found that, "based upon the evidence presented . . . the testimony
of each of these children in a courtroom will result in each child
suffering serious emotional distress . . . such that each of these children
cannot reasonably communicate."  Id., at 66.  The trial court then found
Brooke and three other children competent to testify and accordingly
permitted them to testify against Craig via the one- way closed circuit
television procedure.  The jury convicted Craig on all counts, and the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, 76 Md. App.
250, 544 A. 2d 784 (1988).
    The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded for a new trial.
316 Md. 551, 560 A. 2d 1120 (1989).  The Court of Appeals rejected Craig's
argument that the Confrontation Clause requires in all cases a face-to-face
courtroom encounter between the accused and his accusers, id., at 556-562,
560 A. 2d, at 1122-1125, but concluded:

"[U]nder MDRV 9-102(a)(1)(ii), the operative `serious emotional distress'
which renders a child victim unable to `reasonably communicate' must be
determined to arise, at least primarily, from face-to-face confrontation
with the defendant.  Thus, we construe the phrase `in the courtroom' as
meaning, for sixth amendment and [state constitution] confrontation
purposes, `in the courtroom in the presence of the defendant.'  Unless
prevention of `eyeball-to-eyeball' confrontation is necessary to obtain the
trial testimony of the child, the defendant cannot be denied that right."
Id., at 566, 560 A. 2d, at 1127.


Reviewing the trial court's finding and the evidence presented in support
of the MDRV 9-102 procedure, the Court of Appeals held that, "as [it] read
Coy [v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012 (1988)], the showing made by the State was
insufficient to reach the high threshold required by that case before MDRV
9-102 may be invoked."  Id., at 554-555, 560 A. 2d, at 1121 (footnote
omitted).
    We granted certiorari to resolve the important Confron tation Clause
issues raised by this case.  493 U. S. ---- (1990).

II
    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."
    We observed in Coy v. Iowa that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees
the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the
trier of fact."  487 U. S., at 1016 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U. S.
730, 748, 749-750 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion); California v.
Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97,
106 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 325, 330 (1911); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U. S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S.
237, 244 (1895).  This interpretation derives not only from the literal
text of the Clause, but also from our understanding of its historical
roots.  See Coy, supra, at 1015-1016; Mattox, supra, at 242 (Confrontation
Clause intended to prevent conviction by affidavit); Green, supra, at 156
(same); cf. 3 J. Story, Commentaries MDRV 1785, p. 662 (1833).
    We have never held, however, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees
criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses against them at trial.  Indeed, in Coy v. Iowa, we expressly
"le[ft] for another day . . . the question whether any exceptions exist" to
the "irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: `a right to meet face to
face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.' "  487 U. S., at
1021 (quoting Green, supra, at 175 (Harlan, J., concurring)).  The
procedure challenged in Coy involved the placement of a screen that
prevented two child witnesses in a child abuse case from seeing the
defendant as they testified against him at trial.  See 487 U. S., at
1014-1015.  In holding that the use of this procedure violated the
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, we suggested that any
exception to the right "would surely be allowed only when necessary to
further an important public policy"--i. e., only upon a showing of
something more than the generalized, "legislatively imposed presumption of
trauma" underlying the statute at issue in that case.  Id., at 1021; see
also id., at 1025 (concurring opinion).  We concluded that "[s]ince there
ha[d] been no individualized findings that these particular witnesses
needed special protection, the judgment [in the case before us] could not
be sustained by any conceivable exception."  Id., at 1021.  Because the
trial court in this case made individualized findings that each of the
child witnesses needed special protection, this case requires us to decide
the question reserved in Coy.
    The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it
to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the
trier of fact.  The word "confront," after all, also means a clashing of
forces or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness.  As we
noted in our earliest case interpreting the Clause:

    "The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affi davits, such as were sometimes
admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal ex amination and cross-examination of the witness in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief."  Mattox, supra, at 242-243.


As this description indicates, the right guaranteed by the Confrontation
Clause includes not only a "personal examination," id., at 242, but also
"(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath--thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the
lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to
submit to cross-examination, the `greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth'; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."  Green, 399
U. S., at 158 (footnote omitted).
    The combined effect of these elements of confrontation-- physical
presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier
of fact--serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that
evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the
rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal
proceedings.  See Stincer, supra, at 739 ("[T]he right to confrontation is
a functional one for the purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal
trial"); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion)
("[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal
trials by assuring that `the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the [testimony]' "); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. S.
530, 540 (1986) (confrontation guarantee serves "symbolic goals" and
"promotes reliability"); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 818
(1975) (Sixth Amendment "constitutionalizes the right in an adversary
criminal trial to make a defense as we know it"); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U. S. 668, 684-685 (1984).
    We have recognized, for example, that face-to-face confrontation
enhances the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk that a witness
will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.  See Coy, 487 U. S., at
1019-1020 ("It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person `to
his face' than `behind his back.' . . . That face-to-face presence may,
unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the
same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child
coached by a malevolent adult"); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 63, n. 6
(1980); see also 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *373-*374.  We have also
noted the strong symbolic purpose served by requiring adverse witnesses at
trial to testify in the accused's presence.  See Coy, supra, at 1017
("[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face
confrontation between accused and accuser as `essential to a fair trial in
a criminal prosecution' ") (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 404
(1965)).
    Although face-to-face confrontation forms "the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause," Green, supra, at 157, we have
nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the
confrontation right.  See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 22 (1985)
(per curiam) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the
defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose
[testimonial] infirmities [such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion]
through cross-examination, thereby calling to the at tention of the
factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony");
Roberts, supra, at 69 (oath, cross-examination, and demeanor provide "all
that the Sixth Amendment demands: `substantial compliance with the purposes
behind the confrontation requirement' ") (quoting Green, supra, at 166);
see also Stincer, supra, at 739-744 (confrontation right not violated by
exclusion of defendant from competency hearing of child witnesses, where
defendant had opportunity for full and effective cross-examination at
trial); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 315-316 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U. S. 415, 418 (1965); Pointer, supra, at 406-407; 5 J. Wigmore,
Evidence MDRV 1395, p. 150 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974).
    For this reason, we have never insisted on an actual face- to-face
encounter at trial in every instance in which testimony is admitted against
a defendant.  Instead, we have repeatedly held that the Clause permits,
where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a
defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at
trial.  See, e. g., Mattox, 156 U. S., at 243 ("[T]here could be nothing
more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than the
admission of dying declarations"); Pointer, supra, at 407 (noting
exceptions to the confronta- tion right for dying declarations and "other
analogous situations").  In Mattox, for example, we held that the testimony
of a government witness at a former trial against the defendant, where the
witness was fully cross-examined but had died after the first trial, was
admissible in evidence against the defendant at his second trial.  See 156
U. S., at 240-244.  We explained:

"There is doubtless reason for saying that . . . if notes of [the
witness's] testimony are permitted to be read, [the defendant] is deprived
of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury
which the law has designed for his protection.  But general rules of law of
this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the
accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
the necessities of the case.  To say that a criminal, after having once
been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free
simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be
carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent.  The law
in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly
sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused."  Id., at 243.


We have accordingly stated that a literal reading of the Confrontation
Clause would "abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long
rejected as unintended and too extreme."  Roberts, 448 U. S., at 63.  Thus,
in certain narrow circumstances, "competing interests, if `closely
examined,' may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial."  Id., at 64
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 295 (1973), and citing
Mattox, supra).  We have recently held, for example, that hearsay
statements of nontestifying co- conspirators may be admitted against a
defendant despite the lack of any face-to-face encounter with the accused.
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 (1987); United States v.
Inadi, 475 U. S. 387 (1986).  Given our hearsay cases, the word "confront,"
as used in the Confrontation Clause, cannot simply mean face-to-face
confrontation, for the Clause would then, contrary to our cases, prohibit
the admission of any accusatory hearsay statement made by an absent
declarant--a declarant who is undoubtedly as much a "witness against" a
defendant as one who actually testifies at trial.
    In sum, our precedents establish that "the Confrontation Clause
reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial," Roberts,
supra, at 63 (emphasis added; footnote omitted), a preference that "must
occasionally give way to con siderations of public policy and the
necessities of the case," Mattox, supra, at 243.  "[W]e have attempted to
harmonize the goal of the Clause--placing limits on the kind of evidence
that may be received against a defendant--with a societal interest in
accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-court
statements."  Bourjaily, supra, at 182.  We have accordingly interpreted
the Confrontation Clause in a manner sensitive to its purposes and
sensitive to the necessities of trial and the adversary process.  See, e.
g., Kirby, 174 U. S., at 61 ("It is scarcely necessary to say that to the
rule that an accused is entitled to be confronted with witnesses against
him the admission of dying declarations is an exception which arises from
the necessity of the case"); Chambers, supra, at 295 ("Of course, the right
to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropri- ate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process").  Thus, though we reaffirm the importance of face-to-face
confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we cannot say that such
confrontation is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to confront one's accusers.  Indeed, one commentator
has noted that "[i]t is all but universally assumed that there are
circumstances that excuse compliance with the right of confrontation."
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 107-108 (1972).
    This interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is consistent with our
cases holding that other Sixth Amendment rights must also be interpreted in
the context of the necessities of trial and the adversary process.  See, e.
g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 342-343 (1970) (right to be present
at trial not violated where trial judge removed defendant for disruptive
behavior); Ritchie, 480 U. S., at 51-54 (plurality opinion) (right to
cross-examination not violated where State denied defendant access to
investigative files); Taylor v. United States, 484 U. S. 400, 410-416
(1988) (right to compulsory process not violated where trial judge
precluded testimony of a surprise defense witness); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.
S. 272, 280-285 (1989) (right to effective assistance of counsel not
violated where trial judge prevented testifying defendant from conferring
with counsel during a short break in testimony).  We see no reason to treat
the face-to-face component of the confrontation right any differently, and
indeed we think it would be anomalous to do so.
    That the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does
not, of course, mean that it may easily be dispensed with.  As we suggested
in Coy, our precedents confirm that a defendant's right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face
confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary
to further an important public policy and only where the re liability of
the testimony is otherwise assured.  See Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021 (citing
Roberts, supra, at 64; Chambers, supra, at 295); Coy, supra, at 1025
(concurring opinion).

III
    Maryland's statutory procedure, when invoked, prevents a child witness
from seeing the defendant as he or she testifies against the defendant at
trial.  We find it significant, however, that Maryland's procedure
preserves all of the other elements of the confrontation right: the child
witness must be competent to testify and must testify under oath; the
defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross- examination;
and the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by video
monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he or she testifies.
Although we are mindful of the many subtle effects face-to-face
confrontation may have on an adversary criminal proceeding, the presence of
these other elements of confrontation--oath, cross-examination, and
observation of the witness' demeanor--adequately ensures that the testimony
is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner
functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.  These
safeguards of reliability and adversariness render the use of such a
procedure a far cry from the undisputed prohibition of the Confrontation
Clause: trial by ex parte affidavit or inquisition, see Mattox, 156 U. S.,
at 242; see also Green, 399 U. S., at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against
flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses").
Rather, we think these elements of effective confrontation not only permit
a defendant to "confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child
coached by a malevolent adult," Coy, 487 U. S., at 1020, but may well aid a
defendant in eliciting favorable testimony from the child witness.  Indeed,
to the extent the child witness' testimony may be said to be technically
given out-of-court (though we do not so hold), these assurances of
reliability and adversariness are far greater than those required for
admission of hearsay testimony under the Confrontation Clause.  See
Roberts, 448 U. S., at 66.  We are therefore confident that use of the one-
way closed-circuit television procedure, where necessary to further an
important state interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or
symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
    The critical inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether use of the
procedure is necessary to further an important state interest.  The State
contends that it has a substantial in terest in protecting children who are
allegedly victims of child abuse from the trauma of testifying against the
alleged perpetrator and that its statutory procedure for receiving
testimony from such witnesses is necessary to further that interest.
    We have of course recognized that a State's interest in "the protection
of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment" is a
"compelling" one.  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596,
607 (1982); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 756-757 (1982); FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 749-750 (1978); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U. S. 629, 640 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158,
168 (1944).  "[W]e have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the
physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated
in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights."  Ferber,
supra, at 757.  In Globe Newspaper, for example, we held that a State's
interest in the physical and psychological well-being of a minor victim was
sufficiently weighty to justify depriving the press and public of their
constitutional right to attend criminal trials, where the trial court makes
a case-specific finding that closure of the trial is necessary to protect
the welfare of the minor.  See 457 U. S., at 608-609.  This Term, in
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. ---- (1990), we upheld a state statute that
proscribed the possession and viewing of child pornography, reaffirming
that " `[i]t is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's
interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor" is "compelling." ' "  Id., at ---- [slip op. at 4] (quoting Ferber,
supra, at 756-757).
    We likewise conclude today that a State's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face
his or her accusers in court.  That a significant majority of States has
enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the trauma of giving
testimony in child abuse cases attests to the widespread belief in the
importance of such a public policy.  See Coy, 487 U. S., at 1022-1023
(concurring opinion) ("Many States have determined that a child victim may
suffer trauma from exposure to the harsh atmosphere of the typical
courtroom and have undertaken to shield the child through a variety of
ameliorative measures").  Thirty-seven States, for example, permit the use
of videotaped testimony of sexually abused children;  {2} 24 States have
authorized the use of one-way closed circuit television testimony in child
abuse cases;  {3} and 8 States authorize the use of a two-way system in
which the child-witness is permitted to see the courtroom and the defendant
on a video monitor and in which the jury and judge is permitted to view the
child during the testimony. {4}
    The statute at issue in this case, for example, was specifically
intended "to safeguard the physical and psychological well-being of child
victims by avoiding, or at least minimizing, the emotional trauma produced
by testifying."  Wilder muth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 518, 530 A. 2d 275, 286
(1987).  The Wildermuth court noted:

    "In Maryland, the Governor's Task Force on Child Abuse in its Interim
Report (Nov. 1984) documented the existence of the [child abuse] problem in
our State.  Interim Report at 1.  It brought the picture up to date in its
Final Report (Dec. 1985).  In the first six months of 1985, investigations
of child abuse were 12 percent more numerous than during the same period of
1984.  In 1979, 4,615 cases of child abuse were investigated; in 1984,
8,321.  Final Report at iii.  In its Interim Report at 2, the Commission
proposed legislation that, with some changes, became MDRV 9-102.  The
proposal was `aimed at alleviating the trauma to a child victim in the
courtroom atmosphere by allowing the child's testimony to be obtained
outside of the courtroom.'  Id., at 2.  This would both protect the child
and enhance the public interest by encouraging effective prosecution of the
alleged abuser."  Id., at 517, 530 A. 2d, at 285.


Given the State's traditional and " `transcendent interest in protecting
the welfare of children,' " Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 640 (citation omitted),
and buttressed by the growing body of academic literature documenting the
psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in
court, see Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae
7-13; G. Goodman et al., Emotional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on
Child Sexual Assault Victims, Final Report to the National Institute of
Justice (presented as conference paper at annual convention of American
Psychological Assn., Aug. 1989), we will not second-guess the considered
judgment of the Maryland Legislature regarding the importance of its
interest in protecting child abuse victims from the emotional trauma of
testifying.  Accordingly, we hold that, if the State makes an adequate
showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from
the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently im portant
to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in
such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of
face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.
    The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case- specific
one: the trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the
one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the
welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify.  See Globe
Newspaper Co., 457 U. S., at 608-609 (compelling interest in protecting
child victims does not justify a mandatory trial closure rule); Coy, 487 U.
S., at 1021; id., at 1025 (concurring opinion); see also Hochheiser v.
Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 793, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 283 (1984).
The trial court must also find that the child witness would be traumatized,
not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant.  See,
e. g., State v. Wilhite, 160 Ariz. 228, 772 P. 2d 582 (1989); State v.
Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A. 2d 277 (1989); State v. Davidson, 764 S. W.
2d 731 (Mo. App. 1989); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.
2d 459 (1987).  Denial of face-to-face confrontation is not needed to
further the state interest in protecting the child witness from trauma
unless it is the presence of the defendant that causes the trauma.  In
other words, if the state interest were merely the interest in protecting
child witnesses from courtroom trauma generally, denial of face-to-face
confrontation would be unnecessary because the child could be permitted to
testify in less intimidating surroundings, albeit with the defendant
present.  Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional distress
suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than
de minimis, i. e., more than "mere nervousness or excitement or some
reluctance to testify," Wildermuth, 310 Md., at 524, 530 A. 2d, at 289; see
also State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 511-512, 57 P. 542, 543-544 (1899).  We
need not decide the minimum showing of emotional trauma required for use of
the special procedure, however, because the Maryland statute, which
requires a determination that the child witness will suffer "serious
emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate," MDRV
9-102(a)(1)(ii), clearly suffices to meet constitutional standards.
    To be sure, face-to-face confrontation may be said to cause trauma for
the very purpose of eliciting truth, cf. Coy, supra, at 1019-1020, but we
think that the use of Maryland's special procedure, where necessary to
further the important state interest in preventing trauma to child
witnesses in child abuse cases, adequately ensures the accuracy of the
testimony and preserves the adversary nature of the trial.  See supra, at
11-12.  Indeed, where face-to-face confrontation causes significant
emotional distress in a child witness, there is evidence that such
confrontation would in fact disserve the Confrontation Clause's
truth-seeking goal.  See, e. g., Coy, supra, at 1032 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (face-to-face confrontation "may so overwhelm the child as to
prevent the possibility of effective testimony, thereby undermining the
truth-finding function of the trial itself"); Brief for American
Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 18-24; State v. Sheppard, 197 N.
J. Super. 411, 416, 484 A. 2d 1330, 1332 (1984); Goodman & Helgeson, Child
Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 181,
203-204 (1985); Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View,
85 Mich. L. Rev. 809, 813-820 (1987).
    In sum, we conclude that where necessary to protect a child witness
from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of
the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child's ability
to communicate, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit use of a
procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-face confrontation, ensures
the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous adversarial
testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective confrontation.
Because there is no dispute that the child witnesses in this case testified
under oath, were subject to full cross-examination, and were able to be
observed by the judge, jury, and defendant as they testified, we conclude
that, to the extent that a proper finding of necessity has been made, the
admission of such testimony would be consonant with the Confrontation
Clause.
IV
    The Maryland Court of Appeals held, as we do today, that although
face-to-face confrontation is not an absolute constitutional requirement,
it may be abridged only where there is a " `case-specific finding of
necessity.' "  316 Md., at 564, 560 A. 2d, at 1126 (quoting Coy, supra, at
1025 (concurring opinion)).  Given this latter requirement, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that "[t]he question of whether a child is unavailable to
testify . . . should not be asked in terms of inability to testify in the
ordinary courtroom setting, but in the much narrower terms of the witness's
inability to testify in the presence of the accused."  316 Md., at 564, 560
A. 2d, at 1126 (footnote omitted).  "[T]he determinative inquiry required
to preclude face-to-face confrontation is the effect of the presence of the
defendant on the witness or the witness's testimony."  Id., at 565, 560 A.
2d, at 1127.  The Court of Appeals accordingly concluded that, as a
prerequisite to use of the MDRV 9-102 procedure, the Confrontation Clause
requires the trial court to make a specific finding that testimony by the
child in the courtroom in the presence of the defendant would result in the
child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child could not
reasonably communicate.  Id., at 566, 560 A. 2d, at 1127.  This conclusion,
of course, is consistent with our holding today.
    In addition, however, the Court of Appeals interpreted our decision in
Coy to impose two subsidiary requirements.  First, the court held that
"MDRV 9-102 ordinarily cannot be invoked unless the child witness initially
is questioned (either in or outside the courtroom) in the defendant's
presence."  Id., at 566, 560 A. 2d, at 1127; see also Wildermuth, 310 Md.,
at 523-524, 530 A. 2d, at 289 (personal observation by the judge should be
the rule rather than the exception).  Second, the court asserted that,
before using the one-way television procedure, a trial judge must determine
whether a child would suffer "severe emotional distress" if he or she were
to testify by two-way closed circuit television.  316 Md., at 567, 560 A.
2d, at 1128.
    Reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court in support of the
finding required under MDRV 9-102(a)(1)(ii), the Court of Appeals
determined that "the finding of necessity required to limit the defendant's
right of confrontation through invocation of MDRV 9-102 . . . was not made
here."  Id., at 570-571, 560 A. 2d, at 1129.  The Court of Appeals noted
that the trial judge "had the benefit only of expert testimony on the
ability of the children to communicate; he did not question any of the
children himself, nor did he observe any child's behavior on the witness
stand before making his ruling.  He did not explore any alternatives to the
use of one-way closed-circuit television."  Id., at 568, 560 A. 2d, at 1128
(footnote omitted).  The Court of Appeals also observed that "the testimony
in this case was not sharply focused on the effect of the defendant's
presence on the child witnesses."  Id., at 569, 560 A. 2d, at 1129.  Thus,
the Court of Appeals concluded:


    "Unable to supplement the expert testimony by responses to questions
put by him, or by his own observations of the children's behavior in
Craig's presence, the judge made his MDRV 9-102 finding in terms of what
the experts had said.  He ruled that `the testimony of each of these
children in a courtroom will [result] in each child suffering serious
emotional distress . . . such that each of these children cannot reasonably
communicate.'  He failed to find--indeed, on the evidence before him, could
not have found--that this result would be the product of testimony in a
courtroom in the defendant's presence or outside the courtroom but in the
defendant's televised presence.  That, however, is the finding of necessity
required to limit the defendant's right of confrontation through invocation
of MDRV 9-102.  Since that finding was not made here, and since the
procedures we deem requisite to the valid use of MDRV 9-102 were not
followed, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals must be reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial."  Id., at 570-571, 560 A. 2d, at 1129
(emphasis added).


    The Court of Appeals appears to have rested its conclusion at least in
part on the trial court's failure to observe the children's behavior in the
defendant's presence and its failure to explore less restrictive
alternatives to the use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure.
See id., at 568-571, 560 A. 2d, at 1128-1129.  Although we think such
evidentiary requirements could strengthen the grounds for use of protective
measures, we decline to establish, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for the use of the
one-way television procedure.  The trial court in this case, for example,
could well have found, on the basis of the expert testimony before it, that
testimony by the child witnesses in the courtroom in the defendant's
presence "will result in [each] child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate," MDRV 9-102(a)(1)(ii).
See id., at 568-569, 560 A. 2d, at 1128- 1129; see also App. 22-25, 39, 41,
43, 44-45, 54-57.  So long as a trial court makes such a case-specific
finding of necessity, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a State
from using a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the receipt of
testimony by a child witness in a child abuse case.  Because the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court had not made the requisite finding of
necessity under its interpretation of "the high threshold required by [Coy]
before MDRV 9-102 may be invoked," 316 Md., at 554-555, 560 A. 2d, at 1121
(footnote omitted), we cannot be certain whether the Court of Appeals would
reach the same conclusion in light of the legal standard we establish
today.  We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.






------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
    Section 9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland (1989) provides in full:
    "(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in MDRV 5-701 of the
Family Law Article or Article 27, MDRV 35A of the Code, a court may order
that the testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and
shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit television if:

    "(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
    "(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.

    "(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and
the judge may question the child.
    "(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every
effort to be unobtrusive.
    "(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child
when the child testifies by closed circuit television:

    "(i) The prosecuting attorney;
    "(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
    "(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
    "(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including
a person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning
the abuse.

    "(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the
judge and the defendant shall be in the courtroom.
    "(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with
the persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate
electronic method.
    "(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an
attorney pro se.
    "(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the
defendant in the courtroom at the same time."

For a detailed description of the MDRV 9-102 procedure, see Wildermuth v.
State, 310 Md. 496, 503-504, 530 A. 2d 275, 278-279 (1987).

2
    See Ala. Code MDRV 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15 13-
4251 and 4253(B), (C) (1989); Ark. Code Ann. MDRV 16-44-203 (1987); Cal.
Penal Code Ann. MDRV 1346 (West Supp. 1990); Colo. Rev. Stat. 15 18-3-413
and 18-6- 401.3 (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. MDRV 54-86g (1989); Del. Code
Ann., Tit. 11, MDRV 3511 (1987); Fla. Stat. MDRV 92.53 (1989); Haw. Rev.
Stat., ch. 626, Rule Evid. 616 (1985); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, MDRV 106A-2
(1989); Ind. Code MDRV 35-37-4-8(c), (d), (f), (g) (1988); Iowa Code MDRV
910A.14 (1987); Kan. Stat. Ann. MDRV 38-1558 (1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
MDRV 421.350(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1989); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 278, MDRV
16D (Supp. 1990); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. MDRV 600.2163a(5) (Supp. 1990);
Minn. Stat.  MDRV 595.02(4) (1988); Miss. Code Ann. MDRV 13-1-407 (Supp.
1989); Mo. Rev. Stat. 15 491.675-491.690 (1986); Mont. Code Ann. 15
46-15-401 to 46-15-403 (1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. MDRV 29-1926 (1989); Nev.
Rev. Stat. MDRV 174.227 (1989); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 517:13-a (Supp.
1989); N. M. Stat. Ann. MDRV 30-9-17 (1984); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. MDRV
2907.41(A), (B), (D), (E) (Baldwin 1986); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, MDRV 753(c)
(Supp. 1988); Ore. Rev. Stat. MDRV 40.460(24) (1989); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 15
5982, 5984 (1988); R. I. Gen. Laws MDRV 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); S. C. Code
MDRV 16-3-1530(G) (1985); S. D. Codified Laws MDRV 23A-12-9 (1988); Tenn.
Code Ann. MDRV 24-7-116(d), (e), (f) (Supp. 1989); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code
Ann., Art. 38.071, MDRV 4 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Utah Rule Crim. Proc. 15.5
(1990); Vt. Rule Evid. 807(d) (Supp. 1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. MDRV 967.04(7)
to (10) (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. Stat. MDRV 7-11-408 (1987).

3
    See Ala. Code MDRV 15-25-3 (Supp. 1989); Alaska Stat. Ann. MDRV
12.45.046 (Supp. 1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 13-4253 (1989); Conn.
Gen. Stat. MDRV 54-86g (1989); Fla. Stat. MDRV 92.54 (1989); Ga. Code Ann.
MDRV 17-8-55 (Supp. 1989); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, MDRV 106A-3 (1987);
Ind. Code MDRV 35-37-4-8 (1988); Iowa Code MDRV 910A-14 (Supp. 1990); Kan.
Stat. Ann. MDRV 38-1558 (1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 421-350(1), (3)
(Baldwin Supp. 1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 15:283 (West Supp. 1990);
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. MDRV 9-102 (1989); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,
ch. 278, MDRV 16D (Supp. 1990); Minn. Stat. MDRV 595.02(4) (1988); Miss.
Code Ann. MDRV 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); N. J. Rev. Stat. MDRV 2A:84A-32.4
(Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, MDRV 753(b) (Supp. 1988); Ore. Rev.
Stat. MDRV 40.460(24) (1989); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 15 5982, 5985 (1988); R.
I. Gen. Laws MDRV 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann., Art.
38.071, MDRV 3 (Supp. 1990); Utah Rule Crim. Proc. 15.5 (1990); Vt. Rule
Evid. 807(d) (Supp. 1989).

4
    See Cal. Penal Code Ann. MDRV 1347 (West Supp. 1990); Haw. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 626, Rule Evid. 616 (1985); Idaho Code MDRV 19-3024A (Supp. 1989);
Minn. Stat. MDRV 595.02(4)(c)(2) (1988); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law 15 65.00 to
65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1990); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. MDRV 2907.41(C), (E)
(Baldwin 1986); Va. Code MDRV 18.2-67.9 (1988); Vt. Rule Evid. 807(e)
(Supp. 1989).